Security is a major concern for organizations who wish to leverage cloud computing. In order to reduce security vulnerabilities, public cloud providers o er rewall functionalities. When properly con gured, a rewall protects cloud networks from cyber-a acks. However, proper rewall con guration requires intimate knowledge of the protected system, high expertise and on-going maintenance.
INTRODUCTION
Cloud security introduces unique opportunities as well as challenges, and is the top concern for organizations who wish to leverage the public cloud for their core business infrastructure [7, 15] . While most security breaches can be prevented by proper con guration [5, 9] , the need for highly-customized con gurations makes it prohibitively expensive for many organizations to remain protected over time [4] . is is of increasing importance as large-scale computing is commoditized by the cloud, enabling organization to deploy advanced architectures.
A network endpoint which consists of a Virtual Machine (VM) and an open port, is the gateway to the organization's virtual network (VNet). Endpoints allow the VNet to communicate with other resources and users. Unfortunately, endpoints might allow malicious intenders to gain access and compromise network assets. In response, cloud providers allow control over endpoint access, using a rewall.
e rewall has a list of allowed IP addresses and protocols. Yet, by default, most public cloud providers allow endpoints be accessed from any IP [2, 11] . Most of these endpoints remain with default con guration, because creating and managing white-lists is di cult: IP addresses change, and a miscon guration Benign and malicious IPs a empt to communicate with a cloud endpoint. e recommender learns malicious and benign pa erns, and generates a proper con guration.
can result in a broken service. Figure 1 shows an illustration of the recommendation scenario. Automatic con guration and maintenance of rewall rules has been the subject of extensive research. Existing methods focus on capturing routine network usage with unsupervised methods, such as association rule mining applied on rewall logs [14] , and network tra c logs [1, 8] . Capturing routine usage is also addressed in [12, 16] , where formulation and methods are proposed in order to nd models which re ect network state. In contrast to our approach, previous work produces rewall rules from data of a single resource (losing dependencies between resources). To the best of our knowledge, this work is the rst to introduce a supervised approach to rewall rules generation. is enables us to automatically lter out malicious intenders and scanners which might be allowed by previous methods. Also, we use tra c from network routers, which enables us to produce recommendations without the need to collect rewall logs from each machine.
Recommender systems have become very successful at predicting user-item interactions [13] . Despite their signi cance, few recommendation systems have been proposed for cyber-security. Automated recommendations reduce the expertise level and maintenance costs required to manage security, while minimizing the chances of system interruption. One such example is [10] , where the suggested system provides a list of actions to improve network security, including rewall updates. However, the system does not generate a full rewall con guration from scratch.
In this paper, we present a novel cyber-security recommendation system which generates a list of IP ranges as recommendations for an access white-list for network endpoint rewalls. e system learns from existing white-list con guration authored by cyber-security experts, and predicts the IP ranges to be allowed for uncon gured endpoints. Our dataset is sampled network tra c (NetFlow) from a cloud provider's routers in IPFIX format [3] , collected over three weeks.
e sampling ratio is one every four thousand packets. Each raw sample represents a tra c ow which consists of: timestamp, source and destination IPs and ports, direction, protocol and TCP ags. We refer to IPs that communicate with an endpoint as remote IPs. Each sample describes communication between an endpoint and a remote IP. e processing of ow a ributes into sample features is discussed in Section 2.2. In total, we have a li le over 10 million samples corresponding to 250TB of data.
Endpoints are matched to their rewall con guration. We observe that about 5% of endpoints are manually con gured, overriding the default (allowing all communication). We assume that these endpoints are con gured by domain experts. is assumption was veri ed with a sample of authors. Samples corresponding to these endpoints are considered labeled data, where a sample is labeled positive if the remote IP is allowed and negative otherwise.
Feature Extraction
Our model aims to distinguish between benign and malicious network tra c, learning from the labeled tra c described in Section 2.1 (5% of the entire dataset). To capture the characteristics of a remote IP's behavior, we use features that fall into three categories: (1) e distribution of communication over time, which consists of the percentage of inactive hours, average, maximum and standard deviation of daily and hourly communication volume; (2) e type of tra c, which consists of percentage of incoming and outgoing TCP ags (Syn, Reset, Fin). ese ags are sent when a communication ow has started or ended. Hence, they provide a good indicator to the number of new connections established; (3) e breadth of communication, which consists of: number of VMs communicating with the remote IP, and the number of ports used. We also use a combination of these features by applying a quadratic polynomial kernel. Table 1 provides a full feature list.
For every remote IP, each feature is computed at four di erent levels: (1) entire cloud; (2) organization; (3) VM; and (4) endpoint.
e di erent levels allow the model to learn complex dependencies between the communication routine of a remote IP with an organization's environment, and its interactions with the cloud.
For intuition on the importance of using di erent levels, consider the breadth category. High feature values imply that the remote IP is communicating with many di erent VMs, using various ports and di erent protocols. For feature levels 2-4, this means the remote IP is strongly related to an organization's deployment, thus provides a good indicator that it should be allowed. In contrast, for level 1 it means the remote IP communicates with many cloud deployments and organizations, which is a good indicator of automatic scanning that should be denied.
Learning Models
e cost of denying a remote IP due to misclassifying can be high. If a remote IP communicates heavily with an endpoint, misclassication can break a service. erefore, a key modeling challenge is weighting misclassi cation. 
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To overcome this challenge we de ne a remote IP's importance, with respect to an endpoint, as the relative ratio of its communication with the endpoint. We weight each sample by the remote IP's importance, forcing the model to focus its a ention on high importance remote IPs.
We observe that the negative labeled samples (IPs to deny) represent 3% of labeled samples described in Section 2.1, and only 5% of the total number of tra c ows accounted for by the labeled samples. is is due to the noisy nature of IP communication, enhanced by the exposure of the public cloud to automatic scanners. Scanners may be legitimate, like crawlers, or malicious intenders such as vulnerability scanners. To compensate for the very skewed nature of our classes, we normalize the weights of samples in each class by the total class weight.
We devise two recommendation methods, the rst is used as a baseline.
2.3.1 Baseline. e model collects a list of all remote IPs that communicate with a given endpoint in the three weeks learning period (the entire dataset), and predicts "allow" if and only if an IP is in that list. Due to the underlying sampling of our dataset described in Section 2.1, it is most likely that these IPs communicated with the endpoint many times. is model is unlikely to block routine communication, but it is prone to allow malicious intenders.
SVM Classifier.
We use a binary Support Vector Machine (SVM) with a quadratic polynomial kernel to learn a weight vector for our features, described in Section 2.2, and predict our labels, described in Section 2.1. e classi er is then applied on each instance consisting of an endpoint and remote IP, to predict whether or not the IP should be allowed access to the endpoint. Possible recommendations for W = {011, 101, 110, 111}. A cover with zero noise is presented in blue, and a best possible cover by two pre x sets is presented in purple.
IP GROUPING
When producing a white-list, ranges are easier to comprehend and maintain than single IPs. Furthermore, ranges provide more generalization which improves our recommendation by allowing small uctuations in the IP address. We therefore devise a grouping algorithm using a dynamic programming approach, which transforms a list of IPs into CIDR formated [6] IP ranges. e CIDR format is comprised of a base IP address and a number of least signi cant bits, that can vary within the range. An IP is covered by the range if by neglecting the speci ed number of least signi cant bits, it is the same as the base IP. e goal of our algorithm is to nd ranges which cover all IPs classi ed to be allowed, whilst keeping the number and size of these ranges as small as possible. Running the algorithm multiple times with di erent constraints results in a con gurable recommendation, allowing an organization to decide whether to emphasize reduced a ack surface, or manageability and generalization. Section 4 describes an experiment using the algorithm on real data.
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Problem Statement
Let D be the set of natural numbers from 0 to 2 32 in their binary representation. D represents all possible V4 IP addresses. We de ne authorized IPs as those classi ed to be white-listed. Denote D ⊃ W = {p 1 , . . . , p N } the subset of all N authorized IPs, and p i ∈ W the i'th authorized IP. Given a bit string of length ≤ 32 denoted d, we de ne a pre x set I ⊂ D to be the set of IPs which share d as their most signi cant bit pre x. We say that I is generated from d. e noise of I is |I \W |, which corresponds to the number of unauthorized IPs that share d as their signi cant bit pre x. e pre x notation of a I is its bit pre x d, followed by * to account for bits that can vary within the set. Given two pre x sets, their shared pre x is the longest shared substring of their most signi cant bit pre xes. eir shared pre x set is the pre x set generated from their shared pre x. For example, consider a 5-bit version of D. Let W = {11000, 11001}. Let I 1 be the pre x set of IP addresses with the pre x "110", and I 2 be the pre x set of IP addresses with the pre x "111". e pre x notation of I 1 is "110*", its size is 4 and its noise is 2. e shared pre x of I 1 , I 2 is "11", and their shared pre x set is the pre x set of IP addresses with the pre x "11".
Finally, we de ne a cover C to be a set of pairwise disjoint m pre x sets I i , i.e C = {I 1 , . . . , I m }, which satis es W ⊂ m i=1 I i . We de ne it's noise as
De nition 3.1. Given W = {p 1 , . . . , p N } authorized IPs, L maximum number of pre x sets, and S maximum pre x set size, our objective is to nd a cover C which satis es:
e Grouping Algorithm e IP Grouping method (Algorithm 1) uses dynamic programming to nd the solution to objective function in De nition 3.1. e key to the algorithm is the following: a er each iteration i, j, A i, j holds the minimum noise to cover at least the rst i authorized IPs, by cover length ≤ j, with pre x set sizes ≤ S. For each i, j, the FindMinCover procedure in Algorithm 1 iterates trough the di erent possibilities of adding the i'th IP to an existing cover of j − 1 pre x sets and i − 1 IPs. Hence, by assuming that the smaller covers that were computed in previous iterations are minimal, we are guaranteed to nd the minimum cover in each new iteration. Furthermore, a er the last iteration we have a minimum cover for all N authorized IPs, which satis es our objective function.
e run time complexity of the algorithm is O(N × L × S). In practice, the number of pre x sets is limited by the number of rules allowed in the rewall which is typically small [2, 11] . Furthermore, the maximum pre x set size is also kept small to avoid large ranges (see Section 4). Hence, in practice the run time complexity of the algorithm is O(N ). 1, * 2, 1 * 3, 11 * 3, 11 *
A Short Example
PrintCo er of Sub Procedure 2 with these matrices, we get a minimum cover {11 * , 101, 011} with noise = 0. By initializing j to the maximum number of pre x sets wanted L ≤ L instead of L, one can get every minimum cover for L ≤ L. By summing over the entries of A, one can get the noise of that cover. For example, se ing i ← 2 we get a minimum cover {1 * , 011} with noise = 1. Figure 2 shows these covers as leafs of a binary tree. e reader will notice that the number of rules has become manageable.
EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATION
We start by comparing the results of our baseline and SVM classi er described in Section 2.3, based on hypothesis validation. We use 60% of our labeled data set for learning, 20% for parameter search of the SVM regularization term and 20% as a holdout set for nal evaluation. Note that these percentages are as a part of the labeled data set described in Section 2.1. For each remote IP and endpoint in the holdout set, the trained model predicts whether a domain expert would have included the remote IP in the endpoint's white-list. We then compare the prediction with the known rewall con guration.
To measure the performance, we use AUC over a weighted ROC curve. e samples are weighted as described in Section 2.3, and result in a balance between the classes of IPs that should be allowed and denied. e rewall generation task requires both a high true positive rate which correspond to allowing access to authorized IPs, and a high true negative rate which correspond to denying access from unauthorized IPs. Hence, the AUC metric over a ROC curve is a good measure for the success of our model. We measure an AUC of 0.92 for our polynomial SVM model, compared to 0.58 for our baseline model. Hence, our model provides an improvement of 0.34 in the AUC metric. e improved AUC is a result of learning the features of white-listed remote IPs as opposed to allowing access to remote IPs that historically accessed the endpoint. Figure 3 shows an ROC curve comparison of the baseline model, a linear SVM and For a deeper understanding of the underlying behavior of our model, we analyze our feature importance. Figure 5 provides insights into the combined importance of features in each level, described at the end of Section 2.2. We observe that features in the entire cloud level are the dominant ones for denying access, while allowing access can be a ributed to a combination of entire cloud, organization and endpoint level features.
Algorithm 1 is applied to the results of the model, to generate the nal recommendation. We set L = 200, the default number of rewall rules allowed by major public cloud providers [2, 11] . In addition, we set S = 4096, which can cover the IP range of a small Internet Service Provider [6] , therefore can almost surly cover organizational network. 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we introduced a novel supervised method which recommends rewall rules for cloud endpoints. Our method combines learning from rewall con gurations created by domain experts as well as network tra c analysis to generate a recommendation which excludes malicious intenders. Our experiments show that allowing all remote IPs that frequently interact with the endpoint is not likely to provide a good estimation of a rewall con gured by a domain expert. is stresses the importance of using new methods for rewall rule generation for cloud endpoints. In future research, we plan to adapt the method suggested in this work to produce recommendations for other security and maintenance issues such as VPN con guration and VNET architecture.
